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RETHINKING REGULATION OF
INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURES BY PACS
Wilbur C. Leatherberry*
Campaign finance reform proposals are as common as election-year promisea In-
dependent spending by political action committees (PACs) is a current target of re-
formers' zeaL According to the author, previous reforms created this specter.
Campaign contribution and spending limits imposed out of concern that big money
corrupted candidates and distorted the electoral process encouraged the formation of
PACs and their independent spending for and against candidates. Money that would
have gone to candidates now goes to PACs, and PACs which would have contributed
to candidates now do their own political spending. The author argues that current
reform proposals will have similar, unanticipated adverse effects. He therefore pro-
poses realistic spending and contribution limits and improved disclosure requirements
to safeguard the political process,
INTRODUCTION
IN THE 1980 federal elections, PACs1 independently2 spent more
than $12.9 million supporting presidential candidates and nearly
$1 million supporting candidates for the Senate and House of Rep-
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. A.B., Case
Western Reserve University (1965);. J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law
(1968). The author gained firsthand understanding of election finance reform as legislative
assistant to Representative Louis Stokes (D-Ohio) from 1971-73.
1. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) defines political committee as
"any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregat-
ing in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year." 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (1982). The Presiden-
tial Campaign Fund Act's definition is "any committee, association, or organization (whether
or not incorporated) which accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of
influencing, or attempting to influence, the nomination or election of one or more individuals
to Federal, State, or local elective public office." Id. § 9002(9).
2. FECA defines independent expenditure as
an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation with any
candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is
not made in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any
authorized committee or agent of such candidate.
Id. § 431(17).
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resentatives.3 In addition, PACs spent more than $2 million for
negative advertising in which they attacked one candidate without
promoting another.' In the 1982 congressional election, PACs
spent nearly $1.2 million supporting Senate and House candidates.'
They also doubled their 1980 total in negative advertising by spend-
ing more than $4 million.' PACs not affiliated with any corpora-
tion, union, or trade association made nearly all the independent
expenditures.7 Conservative Republicans were the principal benefi-
ciaries; liberal Democrats were the primary targets. 8
3. FED. ELECTION COMM'N, 1979-1980 INDEX OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES 318
(1981).
4. 1 FED. ELECTION COMM'N, 1979-1980 REPORTS ON FINANCIAL AcTIvrrY, FINAL
REPORT: PARTY AND NON-PARTY POLITICAL COMMrrTEES 125 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
1979-1980 FEC PAC REPORT].
5. 1 FED. ELECTION COMM'N, 1981-1982 REPORTS ON FINANCIAL ACTIvrrY, IN-
TERIM REPORT No. 4: PARTY AND NON-PARTY POLITICAL COMMITrEE 118 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as 1981-1982 FEC PAC REPORT).
6. Id. at 119.
7. In 1980, unaffiliated PACs accounted for more than $11 million in expenditures for
federal candidates. Trade association and health field PACs spent nearly $800,000 and labor
union PACs only $80,000. In the negative spending category, unaffiliated PACs spent ap-
proximately $1.8 million, trade association PACs $190,000, and labor union PACs nearly
$11,000. 1 1979-1980 FEC PAC REPORT, supra note 4, at 124-25. In 1982, with no presi-
dential election, these figures decreased dramatically. Unaffiliated PACs independently spent
only $372,000 in support of candidates. Trade, membership, and health PACs accounted for
$807,000, while labor PACs expended $41,000. 1 1981-1982 FEC PAC REPORT, supra note
5, at 118. However, unaffiliated PACs spent an astounding $4 million in negative advertising,
whereas trade, membership, and health PACs expended a mere $7,561, and labor PACs spent
nothing for negative advertising. Id. at 119.
8. Approximately $11.25 million was spent in the presidential campaigns to support
Republican candidates. 1 1979-1980 FEC PAC REPORT, supra note 4, at 117. Candidate
Reagan received about 78% of this funding. Candidates John Connally and John Anderson
received 14% and 9%, respectively. These percentages likely understate the Reagan share
since they were derived from the percentages individual candidates received during the pre-
nomination period. Reagan, of course, received 100% of the postnomination support. See
FED. ELECTION COMM'N, 1979-1980 REPORTS ON FINANCIAL ACTIVITY, FINAL REPORT:
PRESIDENTIAL PRE-NOMINATION CAMPAIGNS 8 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENTIAL
PRE-NOMINATION REPORT].
A committee to draft Senator Edward Kennedy spent more than $500,000 before he be-
came a candidate. Kennedy supporters also spent $56,000 on behalf of his campaign after he
became a candidate. Id. In contrast, the Carter campaign benefited from only $18,000 in the
prenomination period and $27,000 in the 1979-80 period. Id.; 1 1979-1980 FEC PAC RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 117. The 1980 and 1982 congressional elections also reflected substan-
tial PAC support for Republican candidates. In the 1980 Senate races, nearly $342,000 was
spent independently in support of candidates. Id. at 120. In the House races the comparable
figure was approximately $569,000. Id. at 122. In the 1982 elections, more than $421,000
was spent independently in support of Senate candidates, and $757,000 was expended on
House races. 1 1981-1982 FEC PAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 114-16. Roughly two-thirds
of this money aided Republican candidates. See id.
The most glaring disparity between the parties with respect to independent spending arose
in the negative spending category. Nearly $2 million was spent in opposition to Democratic
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Although independent expenditures were a small percentage of
the total funds spent by PACs in the 1980 federal elections,9 they
were substantial in a few races, especially the presidential campaign.
Independent expenditures supporting Ronald Reagan were more
than one-third the amount the Reagan campaign could spend under
the public financing law."0 PACs raised large sums for the 1984
elections; much of this money was disbursed as independent
expenditures. 1'
candidates in 1980, while less than $100,000 was spent against Republican candidates. 1
1979-1980 FEC PAC REPORT, supra note 4, at 125. These figures rose dramatically in 1982,
with more than $3.5 million being spent in opposition to Democrats, and only $544,000
against Republicans. 1 1981-1982 FEC PAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 119.
In the 1980 presidential election, Democrats fared better than Republicans in only one
category, "communication costs." This category measures corporate, union, and other mem-
bership organization treasury funds used to communicate with members or shareholders in
support of candidates. For further discussion of communication costs, see infra note 187 and
accompanying text. Approximately $4 million of spending in this category was reported in
1980. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1980 ELECTION 122-23 (1983). Democratic presi-
dential candidates received nearly $2.2 million of support, and Republican presidential candi-
dates just $321,000. Id. Much of the spending in this category is not reported. FECA
requires reporting of only those costs that exceed $2,000 per candidate. 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(9)(B)(iii) (1982).
9. Most PACs use their resources primarily to make contributions to candidates. In the
1979-80 reporting period, PACs contributed more than $60 million while independent ex-
penditures on behalf of candidates totaled $12 million. 1 1979-1980 FEC PAC REPORT,
supra note 4, at 101. In the 1981-82 reporting period, PACs contributed more than $87
million to candidates while independent expenditures totaled slightly more than $1.2 million.
1 1981-1982 FEC PAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 95. In 1980, unaffiliated PACs were the
only group spending less on direct candidate contributions than on independent expenditures.
See 1 1979-1980 FEC PAC REPORT, supra note 4, at 101. They made expenditures of $11.3
million and contributions of $5.2 million. Id. In contrast, in the 1981-82 campaign period,
unaffiliated groups contributed $11 million to candidates but spent only $372,000 indepen-
dently in support of candidates. 1 1981-1982 FEC PAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 95.
10. The statute which provides for public funding of presidential general election cam-
paigns requires candidates who accept public funding to agree to a spending limit for the
general election of $20 million, increased every election to allow for inflation. 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(b)-(c) (1982); see generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 9003-9004 (1982) (public financing require-
ments). The limit set for each major party candidate in 1980 was $29.44 million; Carter and
Reagan each received that amount. FED. ELECTION COMM'N, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 7
(1981).
11. For example, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC),
which is the largest and best known of the conservative PACs, ran a $2 million independent
spending campaign against Walter Mondale and planned to spend another $2 million against
three Democratic senatorial candidates. Rebuilding the Right, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1984, at
48, col. 1.
Labor unions spent heavily on voter education, get-out-the-vote drives, and communica-
tion costs to help Mondale win the Democratic presidential nomination. See Old Time Poli-
tics, Wall St. J., July 5, 1984, at 6, col. 4; Stunned by Mondale Defeats, Unions Face a
Problem: Ally Hart Is Hard to Criticize, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1984, at 52, col. 1.
Union PACs also contributed heavily to the delegate committees ostensibly organized by
Mondale convention delegate slates. These committees engaged in what they alleged was
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The channeling of political campaign funds into PACs and of
PAC money into independent expenditures is a direct result of pre-
vious campaign finance reforms, as modified by Supreme Court de-
cisions. Although limits on contributions to and from PACs may
withstand Supreme Court scrutiny, it is unlikely that restraints on
PACs' independent spending will be upheld. 2 During the 1984
Term, the Court is expected to decide the constitutionality of the
only remaining limits on campaign spending by PACs. 3
The results of earlier reforms demonstrate that political money
is like toothpaste in a giant tube: "If the top is squeezed, it moves to
the bottom. If the bottom is squeezed, it moves to the top. If the
middle is squeezed, it moves to both ends. But it is always there,
and it will always move to the point of least resistance."' 14
This Article examines the genesis of independent expenditures
by PACs, 5 discusses the issues such spending raises,16 and consid-
ers proposed means of regulation. 7 Finally, it advocates changes in
the overall system of federal campaign finance regulation that will
curb further growth in independent spending by PACs. 8
I. GENESIS
Neither the PAC nor the independent expenditure of campaign
funds is new. Corporations and labor unions have used both de-
independent spending in support of Mondale in their local areas. One reason for the tactic
was Mondale's vow that he would accept no PAC contributions. See Hart Attacks Mondale
Delegate Groups, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1984, at 37, col. 1. This device also enabled the
Mondale campaign to exceed spending ceilings in some states. E.g., Mondale Spending Ex-
ceeded Ceiling in New Hampshire, Wall St. J., Apr. 30, 1984, at 46, col. 1. Vigorous criticism
by his opponents and by the media forced Mondale to terminate the committees and to take
steps to return the funds. See Mondale Directs Disputed Groups to End Operation, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 26, 1984, at 1, col. 8. Despite Mondale's directive, it appeared that several
months would elapse before the delegate groups ceased operations. See Delegate Groups Con-
tinue Despite Mondale's Pledge, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
12. See infra notes 124-43 and accompanying text.
13. See Democratic Party v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 578 F.
Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (three-judge district court found unconstitutional the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund Act's limit of $1,000 on independent spending by PACs in presi-
dential campaigns), prob. juris noted sub nom. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Con-
servative Political Action Comm., 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984). For further discussion of this case,
see infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
14. J. ARMOR, TAX MONEY VS. PRIVATE MONEY: PRACTICAL, THEORETICAL & CON-
STITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE FUNDING OF FEDERAL ELECTIONS 9 (1983) (pam-
phlet published by Public Service Research Foundation).
15. See infra notes 19-54 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 55-143 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 144-81 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
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vices for years to avoid prohibitions against making direct political
contributions and expenditures.' 9
One of the purposes of the prohibitory legislation was to prevent
corruption of the electoral process and of candidates.20 Over the
years, courts allowed unions and corporations to make what are
now called independent expenditures, perhaps because they thought
the corruption potential of such expenditures was minimal. 2 The
courts permitted political publications and media advertising di-
rected at union members even when the message also reached non-
members.22 Voter registration drives and other "nonpartisan"
19. President Theodore Roosevelt urged the prohibition of corporate contributions
which Congress enacted in 1907. See Act of January 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (current
version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982)); Bolton, Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corpo-
rate and Union Political Speech, 22 ARIz. L. REv. 373, 375-81 (1980). Union contributions
were first limited to $5,000 by the Hatch Act in 1940, ch. 640, § 13, 54 Stat. 767, 770 (1940)
(repealed 1943), then altogether barred by the War Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act, ch.
144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167 (1943) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982)). The Labor-
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 made permanent this provision of the
Smith-Connally Act, which was scheduled to expire six months after the end of World War
II. Ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947). Taft-Hartley also initiated the prohibition of
political expenditures by corporations. Bolton, supra, at 385.
20. Commentators differ over President Theodore Roosevelt's precise motivation for op-
posing corporate contributions. Compare Note, Corporate Democracy and the Corporate
Political Contribution, 61 IOWA L. Rav. 545, 546-49 (1975) (asserting that avoidance of can-
didate corruption by corporations was Roosevelt's principal objective) with Bolton, supra
note 19, at 375-79 (asserting that Roosevelt's main purpose was protecting shareholders'
rights and that the corruption which concerned Roosevelt was corruption of the electorate,
not candidates). The first court to construe the original prohibition of corporate political
contributions stated that the statute's "purpose is to guard elections from corruption."
United States v. United States Brewers' Ass'n, 239 F. 163, 169 (W.D. Pa. 1916). That court's
opinion lends credence to the idea that Congress feared corruption of the electorate rather
than of candidates. The court stated that "the concerted use of money is one of the many
dangerous agencies in corrupting the elector and debauching the election." Id.
21. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), which discounts the
corruption potential of independent expenditures.
22. Soon after political expenditures were prohibited, the CIO and its president were
indicted for using union funds to publish a union newspaper urging union members to vote
for a candidate. In United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948), the Court avoided first amend-
ment issues and held that the statutory prohibition did not apply to union funds used to
publish and distribute a regular periodical, even if the publication endorsed a candidate. Id.
at 123. The indictment did not specifically allege that the periodical went to nonsubscribers
or nonmembers. The Court assumed that the newsletter went "to those accustomed to re-
ceive copies." Id. However, some nonmembers must have been "accustomed to receive cop-
ies." Rauh, Legality of Union Political Expenditures, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 152, 156 n.19
(1961). In United States v. Painters Union, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949), the court held that
the statute did not prohibit the use of union treasury funds to buy political advertisements
supporting a candidate on a commercial radio station and in a newspaper of general circula-
tion. The court noted that the union had no house periodical. Id. at 856. In a subsequent
case, the Supreme Court avoided the first amendment issue and refused to hold that the
statute permitted all union expenditures for political advertising. The Court reversed the
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
political activities, conducted by unions with union funds, were held
not to violate the prohibitions even though the unions designed
these drives to help favored candidates.23
A second apparent purpose of the prohibition against corporate
and union contributions was to prevent misuse of funds which be-
longed to union members or corporate shareholders. Although cor-
porate or union treasury funds could not be used for political
contributions, courts began to allow union members and corporate
shareholders voluntarily to contribute money for political causes.2 4
PACs began to collect these voluntary contributions from individ-
ual members or shareholders and then disburse these sums to candi-
dates. Candidates could identify the PAC contribution with the
interests of the parent corporation or union.
Independent expenditures enabled corporations and labor un-
ions to use treasury funds for political purposes, and the formation
of PACs enabled them to collect, aggregate, and contribute non-
treasury political money. These devices gave corporations and un-
ions political influence which the reformers had neither expected
nor desired. Contribution and spending limits imposed in the
1970's further stimulated the formation of PACs and the growth of
their independent expenditures."
During the 1970's, Congress reformed and regulated the financ-
ing of federal political campaigns by enacting the Federal Election
lower court's dismissal of an indictment which charged that the defendant had "used union
dues to sponsor commercial television broadcasts designed to influence the electorate to select
certain candidates for Congress." United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957). The case
was remanded to the trial court for proof on several factual issues deemed important by the
Court: (1) whether the money was from dues or voluntary contributions; (2) whether the
broadcast reached the public or just the membership; (3) whether the union was engaged in
"active electioneering," or was just stating the candidates' records; and (4) whether the union
intended to influence the outcome of the election. Id. at 592. On remand, the union was
acquitted by a jury "even though the union did not contest the bare allegations of the indict-
ment." Rauh, supra, at 160 n.40.
23. "[S]urely it could not have been the intention of the Congress to deprive any group,
labor organization or corporation from making expenditures. . . in connection with the re-
gistration of voters, for such registration is beneficial to all candidates. . . and to all political
parties." United States v. Construction & Gen. Laborers Local 264, 101 F. Supp. 869, 875
(W.D. Mo. 1951). Unions have, however, used supposedly nonpartisan voter registration
activity to support particular candidates. Bolton, supra note 19, at 392-93; Rauh, supra note
22, at 154-55.
24. See, e.g., United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 592 (1957); United States v.
Anchorage Cent. Labor Council, 193 F. Supp. 504, 507 (D. Alaska 1961).
25. The number of PACs has increased from 609 to 3,803 in the last decade. Behind All
the Fuss Over Election Money, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 8, 1984, at 73.
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Campaign Act of 1971. u2 This statute largely relied on disclosure
of individual contributions and candidate expenditures. The only
limit was on candidates' media expenditures. Amounts spent by
others for media on behalf of a candidate were counted toward the
candidate's expenditure limit.u7 This provision was the first that at-
tempted to reach independent expenditures.2 8
The conduct of the presidential election of 1972 and the subse-
quent Watergate investigation spurred efforts to improve the 1971
legislation. The Senate Select Committee that conducted the
Watergate investigation recommended limits on contributions in all
federal campaigns and on expenditures in presidential campaigns.2 9
Senate and House committees studying the proposals believed that
disclosure alone, without limits on contributions and expenditures,
was inadequate.30 The result was the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974. 3t In the 1974 amendments, Congress
imposed limits on contributions to federal candidates and on candi-
date and independent expenditures. Congress also provided public
financing for presidential campaigns.
In the 1974 legislation, the definition of a "contribution" in-
cluded virtually any transfer of money to a candidate or his com-
mittee for campaign uses.32 "Expenditure" was defined to cover all
26. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455
(1982)).
27. Id. § 104(a)(6), 86 Stat. at 6 (repealed 1976).
28. "[A]mounts spent for use of communications media on behalf of any . .. candidate
for Federal ... office ... [were to] be deemed to have been spent by the candidate..
whether or not the person making the expenditure is authorized by the candidate to do so."
S. CONF. REP. No. 580, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 25-26, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1866, 1871.
29. See S. REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 567-71 (1974).
30. The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration stated in its report on the bill
that the scurrying to raise funds before the disclosure provisions of the 1971 Act became
effective "resulted in broad and grave dissatisfaction with the Act and led to a demand for
new and more comprehensive controls." S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5587, 5588. The Committee on House Administration
stated the matter more bluntly:
The unchecked rise in campaign expenditures, coupled with the absence of limita-
tions on contributions and expenditures, has increased the dependence of candidates
on special interest groups and large contributors. Under the present law the im-
pression persists that a candidate can buy an election by simply spending large sums
in a campaign.
H.R. REP. No. 1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974).
31. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455
(1982)).
32. Id. § 102(c), 88 Stat. at 1269-70 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)-(B)
(1982)).
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payments to others to promote a candidate's election.33 Although
candidates and their committees make most expenditures, Congress
imposed limits on independent spending as well. The dollar limit
on independent expenditures in Senate and House campaigns was
$1,000 for all individuals and PACs.34 The limit on contributions
in congressional campaigns was $1,000 for individuals and PACs
but $5,000 for multicandidate PACs.35 Although there was no limit
on individuals' independent expenditures in a presidential cam-
paign, a PAC could spend no more than $1,000.36 Contributions to
presidential candidates who accept public financing were barred in
the general election campaign. 37  The statutory dollar limits en-
couraged contributions rather than independent expenditures be-
cause of the higher limit for contributions by multicandidate PACs.
Buckley v. Valeo,38 a 1976 Supreme Court decision, changed the
whole scheme. In Buckley, the Court struck down all expenditure
limits, except for publicly funded candidates and independently
spending political committees in presidential campaigns. The Court
found that expenditure limits restricted political speech in violation
of the first amendment, but that the provision of basic funding from
the public treasury justified the spending limits on publicly funded
candidates in the presidential campaign. 39 The Court upheld con-
tribution limits because of the risk of corruption and the appearance
33. Id. § 102(d), 88 Stat. at 1270-71 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)-(B)
(1982)).
34. Id. § 108(a), 88 Stat. at 1265 (repealed 1976).
35. Id. § 101(a), 88 Stat. at 1263 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)-(2) (1982)).
36. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 9012(0, 85 Stat.
562, 572 (1972) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 9012(0(1) (1982)).
37. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9003(b)(2), 9012(b)(1) (1982). The prohibition is directed at the candi-
date and his authorized committee, not the contributor. Candidates are forbidden to accept
contributions except to make up a deficiency if federal funds available are less than the spend-
ing limit. Id. § 9012(b)(1).
38. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
39. Id. at 58. In Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 445 U.S. 955,
affg summarily 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the Supreme Court upheld public financ-
ing of presidential elections, a question which appeared already to have been resolved in
Buckley. Suits to "implement or construe" the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act are
to be heard by a district court panel of three judges, with appeal directly to the Supreme
Court. 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b) (1982). The three-judge district court in Republican Nat'l
Comm. said candidates may forego their rights to unlimited contributions and expenditures
in exchange for public funding. 487 F. Supp. at 283-84. Because candidates are not com-
pelled to abide by the spending limit and public funding provides merely an additional fund-
ing alternative, the court said the provisions of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act
did not violate the first amendment rights of either candidates or supporters. Id. at 285. The
court assumed that limits on independent expenditures by PACs in presidential elections had
been held unconstitutional in Buckley. Id. at 286.
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of corruption when individuals or PACs seeking political favors can
make unlimited contributions to candidates.' The Court found
that expenditure limits directly burdened speech while the danger of
corruption and the appearance of corruption outweighed the more
indirect speech involved in political contributions.4
After Buckley, all PACs had an incentive to make independent
expenditures rather than contributions. Contributions were subject
to the $1,000 or $5,000 per candidate per election limits, while the
only limit on independent expenditures was the one restricting PAC
spending in presidential campaigns.
The constitutionality of this limit was dubious after Buckley.
Five PACs announced that they intended to raise and spend mil-
lions of dollars supporting Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential
race.42 They purported to be independent of Reagan and his elec-
tion committee, so that their spending would not violate contribu-
tion limits or be treated as expenditures made by Reagan or his
committee.43
In Common Cause v. Schmitt,' Common Cause and the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) sued to enjoin these independent PAC
expenditures. However, a three-judge district court panel45 found
the $1,000 limit on independent expenditures "facially unconstitu-
tional,"46 reiterating the Buckley rationale that there is little risk of
corruption or apparent corruption from independent expendi-
tures.47 Further, the panel refused to hear Common Cause's claim
that the PACs had coordinated their expenditures with the Reagan
campaign, on the ground that the FEC had exclusive jurisdiction to
enforce the statute.48
On appeal, the Supreme Court split four to four, allowing the
panel's decision to stand.49 The battle over the constitutionality of
the independent spending limit in presidential campaigns may be
40. See 424 U.S. at 24-38.
41. Id. at 58-59.
42. For a listing of the five committees and a description of their activities in 1980, see
Note, The Constitutionality of Regulating Independent Expenditure Committees in Publicly
Funded Presidential Campaigns, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 679, 685-88 (1981).
43. Id. at 687.
44. 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), affid without opinion by an equally divided court,
455 U.S. 129 (1982). Common Cause and the FEC had filed separate suits which were con-
solidated in the district court. 512 F. Supp. at 489.
45. Such panels are required by 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b) (1982). See supra note 39.
46. 512 F. Supp. at 489.
47. Id. at 494-96.
48. Id. at 501-03.
49. 455 U.S. at 129. Justice O'Connor did not participate, apparently because her bus-
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settled by the Supreme Court in its 1984 Term."
Since Buckley, the number of PACs and the amount of their
independent expenditures have grown tremendously. PACs can
now raise enormous sums of political money from a large number of
donors and use the money to elect federal candidates without violat-
ing any of the remaining restrictions on contributions or
expenditures.
In light of Common Cause v. Schmitt, it is unlikely that any
well-managed PAC will be subject to sanctions because its expendi-
tures are found to be not independent. Sanctions are improbable
since private parties cannot sue to enforce the campaign finance
statute,51 and the agency which is charged with enforcement, the
FEC, is deadlocked because its membership is equally divided be-
tween Democrats and Republicans.5 Injunctive relief during a
campaign is unlikely due to administrative delays and the FEC's
understandable reluctance to intervene quickly and risk tilting an
election. Politicians seldom seek postelection sanctions since they
do not change the outcome. Traditionally, election losers do not
complain about how winners won, and winners do not complain
about ineffective misconduct. Given the difficulties of proving coor-
dination of expenditures with a candidate or his committee, neither
a candidate nor the FEC is likely to pursue postelection remedies.53
Some revisions are needed to insure that independent expendi-
band had served on the finance committee of a pro-Reagan independent spending PAC. E.
DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY 143 (1983).
50. The FEC and the Democratic National Committee filed separate actions seeking
declaratory judgments that the statute was constitutional. The cases were consolidated. A
three-judge district court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. Democratic Party v.
National Conservative Political Action Comm., 578 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1983), prob. juris.
noted sub nom. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984).
51. The three-judge panel in Schmitt said private plaintiffs cannot enforce compliance
with the campaign financing statutes, because 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1) (1982) reserves exclusive
jurisdiction over civil enforcement of the provisions of both FECA and the Presidential Elec-
tion Campaign Fund Act to the FEC. 512 F. Supp. at 502. In Democratic Party v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., the three-judge panel said private plaintiffs could sue to
obtain a declaratory judgment on constitutionality under 26 U.S.C. § 901 I(b) (1982). 578 F.
Supp. at 803-07. The court said there is no private right of action under FECA but that this
does not extend to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act. Id. at 807 n.12.
52. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(2)(A) (1982).
53. See Note, Campaign Finance Re-Reform: The Regulation of Independent Political
Committees, 71 CAL. L. REv. 673, 690-91 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Campaign Fi-
nance Re-Reform]; Note, Independent Political Committees and the Federal Election Laws,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 978-83 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Independent Political
Committees].
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tures are really independent. 4 This is a difficult task which will not
solve the problems caused by independent PAC spending. Indeed,
the less control the candidate has over campaign spending, the more
serious some of the problems may become.
II. ISSUES RAISED BY THE PAC PHENOMENON
A. Inequality
1. First Impressions
Most discussions about the impact of PACs focus on the gross
inequality that could arise if all PAC support flowed to candidates
of one party. A major purpose of the campaign finance legislation
passed by the Democratic Congress in 1974 was reducing the Re-
publican Party's traditional fundraising advantage while preserving
or enhancing the power of pro-Democratic labor unions.55
The campaign reform legislation of the 1970's clarified and en-
hanced the pro-Democratic labor unions' use of PACs. The same
legislation facilitated the growth of corporate and unaffiliated con-
servative PACs. 6 The Democratic party tried "reform" legislation
54. For discussions of the present problems in distinguishing between independent ex-
penditures and contributions and suggested standards for making the distinction, see Note,
Campaign Finance Re-Reform, supra note 53, at 691-702; Note, Making Campaign Finance
Law Enforceable: Closing the Independent Expenditure Loophole, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
363, 370-83 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Making Campaign Finance Law Enforceable].
55. The 1974 debates reveal the political motivation behind the FECA Amendments of
1974. One need not be "overly cynical" (in the words of Senator James Buckley) to recognize
that the legislation proposed and passed by a Congress controlled by Democrats was designed
to help Democrats. See 120 CONG. REc. 8469 (1974).
The principal provisions thought to favor Democrats were the public financing provisions
and the expenditure limits. It was suggested that the low expenditure limits contained in the
House bill were designed to protect incumbents, most of whom were Democrats at the time.
Id. at 9540. The advantage of incumbency was one thing the Republicans who voted for the
legislation had in common with the Democrats. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 27,217 (1974)
(statement of Rep. Clarence Brown).
Professor Ralph Winter said that "the exercise.., going on in Congress is not the
cleansing of the political process but the skewing of it. Those in power are seeking to maxi-
mize that power." Id. at 10,561. Winter suggested that unions favored elimination of private
contributions "because their own power would be relatively increased as a result of the host
of 'indirect contributions' they can provide." Id. Senator Tower offered an amendment to
limit such "indirect contributions" by unions. The amendment was defeated with few Demo-
crats supporting it. Id. at 10,932-33. Republican Representative Crane would have offered a
similar amendment in the House but the rule which was adopted barred it. Id. at 27,226-27.
56. The 1971 legislation continued the prior prohibition of corporate and labor union
contributions to campaigns but introduced the separate segregated fund concept. FECA,
Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982)). Labor
union PACs were permitted to solicit contributions from members and corporate PACs were
permitted to solicit contributions from shareholders. The Supreme Court, relying on the
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as a way to shift campaign finance inequities to its side of the bal-
ance. Ironically, the legislation produced an astounding increase in
pro-Republican, business PACs, enhancing any existing campaign
finance inequities in favor of Republicans.5 7
The popular view is that this growth helps conservative Repub-
lican candidates and hurts liberal Democrats. This may not even be
true in open-seat elections, where most PAC money is thought to
flow to the Republican candidate. 8 In other elections, incumbents
1971 statute, has upheld the legality of a union-controlled separate segregated fund. Pipefit-
ters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
The FEC has interpreted the 1971 law to permit corporations to solicit employees as well
as shareholders. FEC Advisory Opinion (SUN PAC), 40 Fed. Reg. 56,584 (1975). Appar-
ently concerned that the FEC had tipped the balance too far toward the corporate PACs by
broadening their base for solicitations, Congress narrowed the class of corporate employees
from whom separate segregated funds could solicit contributions. Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 112,
90 Stat. 475, 491-92 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A) (1982)). The 1976 legisla-
tion provided that only shareholders and executive and administrative personnel and their
families could be solicited generally by a corporate PAC, and that only union members and
their families could be solicited generally by a labor PAC. Id. Twice a year a corporate PAC
was permitted to solicit its union employees by mail and a union PAC was permitted to solicit
the employer's shareholders and executive and administrative personnel in the same manner.
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (1982). The legislation prohibited company or union creation of
multiple PACs to avoid the contribution limits. Id. § 441a(a)(5). Union PACs were given
the right to use payroll deductions to collect contributions if the company used that method
to collect money from its constituency. Id. § 441b(b)(6). Finally, other types of organiza-
tions, including trade associations, were authorized to form PACs. Id. § 441b(b)(4)(D).
Thus, the "reform" legislation has been described as the "root cause of the PAC Phenome-
non." Epstein, The PAC Phenomenon: An Overview, 22 ARIz. L. REV. 354, 358 (1980).
57. Fed. Election Comm'n, PAC's Increase in Number (Jan. 14, 1983) (press release).
The inference that business involvement in electoral politics has risen dramatically is not
necessarily supported by the PAC figures, however. "The problem with the inference is that
a business PAC contribution is only one of a number of ways in which people in business
participate in electoral politics." Malbin, Neither a Mountain nor a Molehill, REGULATION,
May/June 1979, at 42. Before the campaign reforms, business executives could give unlim-
ited individual contributions, and corporate funds were passed to candidates through individ-
uals or through in-kind services such as use of corporate aircraft. "Faced with all this,
Congress decided in 1974 that it preferred the open participation of corporations through
political action committees to the covert participation then in vogue." Id.
58. In the 1980 election, Republicans running for open seats in the Senate received over
twice as much total PAC support, $2,047,000, as Democrats, $924,000. 1 1981-1982 FEC
PAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 100-02. Corporate PACs contributed $1,226,000 to Republi-
cans and only $123,000 to Democrats in these races. Id. Union PACs gave $460,000 to
Democrats and only $30,900 to Republicans. Id. In the House, however, Democrats re-
ceived slightly more, $4.78 million in total PAC support, than Republicans, $4.6 million, in
the races for open seats. Id. Although the corporate PACs gave three times as much to
Republicans as to Democrats, $1.92 million to $654,000, the labor PACs more than made up
for the difference by supporting Democrats over Republicans $2.51 million to $121,000. Id.
Democrats are doing well in the quest for PAC money for the 1984 election. As of May
1, 1984, Democrats had raised a larger percentage of their funds from PACs than Republi-
cans. House Reelection Campaigns, Wall St. J., May 1, 1984, at 62, col. 1.
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of both parties are the prime beneficiaries.5 9 Despite the current
tendency of PACs to support incumbents, liberals fear the balance
will shift because there are nearly twice as many conservative indi-
vidual PAC contributors as liberal contributors.6 ° In addition,
PACs unconnected to any business, union, or trade association are
overwhelmingly conservative, and these PACs do most of the in-
dependent spending. Of the ten largest independent spending PACs
in 1982, unaffiliated conservative PACs spent nearly $5 million
while unaffiliated liberal PACs spent less than $300,000.61
2. A Closer Examination of Spending Disparities
The conservatives' financial advantage is far less significant than
it first appears. Conservative PACs reported $10.6 million in in-
dependent expenditures for Reagan during the 1980 general election
campaign.6 2 However, a large percentage was spent on direct mail
fundraising. It is likely that no more than one-third of the $10.6
million went into media advertising supporting Reagan. 3 Direct
mail fundraising costs were reported as independent expenditures in
support of Reagan since PACs identified him as their candidate in
solicitation letters.' Those letters were sent to conservatives-peo-
ple already leaning toward Reagan.65 Thus, the PACs' impact on
the 1980 presidential campaign was less significant than it appears
from the expenditure statistics alone.
59. In the 1980 election, PACs gave three times as much to incumbents as challengers.
1 1981-1982 FEC PAC REPORT, supra note 5, at 100-02. As of May 1, 1984, 93% of PAC
contributions to House members had gone to incumbents. House Reelection Campaigns,
supra note 58, at 62, col. 1.
60. There are about seven million potential liberal donors and about fourteen million
conservatives. 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1905, 1906 (1981).
In 1982 it appeared that labor PACs focused attention on the House to preserve Demo-
cratic control since there was little hope that the Democrats could retake the Senate. Corpo-
rate PACs may have given more to Democrats in open seat elections because they knew that
the Democrats would remain in control and that Democrats would win more of the open
seats since most of them had been held by Democrats.
61. Of the ten largest independent spending PACs in 1981-82, the top seven were con-
servative, and the bottom three were liberal. Independent Spending Increases, FED. ELEC-
TION COMM'N REc., Dec. 1983, at 8. NCPAC, the largest conservative PAC, spent twenty
times as much as its largest liberal counterpart, the Progressive Political Action Committee.
Id. Only three of these ten independent spending PACs were connected to other organiza-
tions (the National Rifle Association, the American Medical Association, and the Realtors).
Id. None were connected to a labor union. Id. Negative expenditures amounted to approxi-
mately 80% of the total spent by the group. Id.
62. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 303.
63. See id. at 318-19.
64. Id. at 319.
65. Id.
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Similarly, independent PAC spending alone does not explain the
results of senatorial races. The National Conservative Political Ac-
tion Committee (NCPAC) targeted a number of incumbent Demo-
cratic senators in 1980.66 Four 1980 races illustrate the extent of
PAC influence in that election: even though all four Democrats
lost, NCPAC's spending did not give the Republicans a substantial
spending advantage in any of the races. Indeed, the 1980 Reagan
landslide may have been the most important factor in the ouster of
these Democratic senators.67 For instance, Senator Frank Church
lost to Republican Steve Symms, but outspent Symms in direct ex-
penditures $1.9 million to $1.8 million.68 Symms' campaign was
further aided by $339,000 in independent spending against
Church.69 However, Church had the advantage of being an incum-
bent, which has been valued at approximately $500,000. 71 In spite
of the independent PAC spending, then, Church had an overall fi-
nancial advantage.
In South Dakota, where Senator George McGovern lost his seat
to James Abdnor, McGovern's direct spending exceeded Abdnor's
by $1 million.71 Independent spending against McGovern totaled
about $210,000.72 When McGovern's incumbency advantage is
considered, his resources exceeded Abdnor's by more than $1
million.
Senator Birch Bayh lost to Dan Quayle in Indiana, but Bayh's
direct expenditures exceeded Quayle's by about $430,000.73 In-
dependent spending against Bayh totaled about $180,000. 7' Even
66. Id. at 396-98.
67. See id. at 396-400.
68. FED. ELECTION COMM'N, 1979-1980 REPORTS ON FINANCIAL AcTIvITY, FINAL
REPORT: U.S. SENATE AND HOUSE CAMPAIGNS 222-26 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1979-
1980 FEC SENATE AND HOUSE CAMPAIGNS REPORT].
69. Id.
70. This estimate was made in 1977 and includes salary, staff, the franking privilege, and
office and travel allowances. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS,
AND POLITICAL REFORM 146, 154-55 (2d ed. 1980).
In Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980), a
supporter of Senator Kennedy unsuccessfully challenged President Carter's alleged abuse of
his incumbency. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing and therefore did not reach
the merits. 628 F.2d at 137. For further analysis of this case, see Note, Winpisinger v. Wat-
son: Challenging the Incumbency Advantage in Presidential Elections, 1 J.L. & POL. 167
(1983).
71. 1979-1980 FEC SENATE AND HOUSE CAMPAIGNS REPORT, supra note 68, at 413-
18.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 239-44.
74. Id.
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without the incumbency advantage, then, Bayh spent substantially
more than was spent for Quayle.
Only in Iowa, where Senator John Culver lost to Charles
Grassley, did a Republican challenger outspend a targeted Demo-
cratic incumbent with the aid of independent PAC spending.
Grassley's direct spending exceeded Culver's, $2.2 million to $1.8
million.75 About $187,000 was independently spent against Culver,
while only about $60,000 was independently spent to support him.7 6
When Culver's incumbency advantage is added to his
total, however, Grassley's spending advantage was less than
$100,000. Moreover, independent spending may have been less
effective than direct spending in these senatorial races. Up to half
of NCPAC's spending was for direct mail fundraising, some of
which was sent to out-of-state residents who could not vote for the
NCPAC candidate. s7
In 1982, without Reagan on the ballot, conservative PACs could
not claim as great an apparent influence in defeating Democrats.
For example, Republican Raymond Shamie outspent Edward Ken-
nedy by about $25,000,78 and PACs independently spent more than
$600,000 to oppose Kennedy.79 Nonetheless, Kennedy won eas-
ily." In Maryland, incumbent Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes
outspent Lawrence Hogan $400,000 to $210,000, but PACs spent
nearly $500,000 attacking Sarbanes.8 Yet Sarbanes still won. 2
These examples debunk the myth that PACs in general, and in-
dependent spending PACs in particular, have caused the recent
election losses suffered by liberal Democrats. Money provided by
NCPAC and its ilk has not overwhelmed Democratic candidates.
75. Id. at 245-56.
76. Id.
77. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 400.
78. FED. ELECTION COMM'N, 1981-1982 REPORTS ON FINANCIAL ACTIVrrY, INTERIM
REPORT No. 1: U.S. SENATE AND HOUSE CAMPAIGNS 189-94 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
1981-1982 FEC SENATE AND HOUSE CAMPAIGNS REPORT].
79. Id.
80. See 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2789, 2792 (1982) (Kennedy won 61% of the vote).
81. 1981-1982 FEC SENATE AND HOUSE CAMPAIGNS REPORT, supra note 78, at 183-
88. NCPAC may have forced Sarbanes to spend more money early in his campaign than he
otherwise would have. By June 30, 1982, Sarbanes had spent 46% of his funds to combat the
negative spending by NCPAC. However, this negative advertising also made it easier for
Sarbanes to raise money from liberal PACs and individuals. Hogan had spent 98% of his
money by June 30 and may have been relying heavily on NCPAC support. 40 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1987, 1987 (1982).
82. See 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2789, 2792 (1982) (Sarbanes received 63% of the
vote, 7% more than he received in 1976).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
3. Practical and Constitutional Restraints on Efforts to Equalize
Funding
In Buckley v. Valeo,83 the Supreme Court rejected the use of
expenditure limits to achieve or approach the goal of equality of
campaign funding.84 Rather, the Court found spending limits un-
constitutional as direct restrictions on the quantity of political
speech." The Court held that the equality principle underlying vot-
ing rights and reapportionment cases did not justify restrictions on
political expression." The premise underlying the Buckley decision
was that first amendment objectives are better served if candidates
have unrestricted access to voters than if access is equalized by a
limit on expenditures.87 The Court pointed out nonfunding advan-
tages that one candidate may have over another, for example, name
recognition and incumbency in the same or a different office.88
The Court recognized that achieving true equality among candi-
dates is impossible. Incumbents, not their challengers, are benefited
by equal expenditure limits since incumbents already have high
name recognition and can campaign indirectly without spending
campaign funds. They can, for example, use congressional franking
privileges, introduce legislation benefiting their districts, and manu-
facture news events.89
Nonetheless, some proponents of campaign finance reforms con-
tinue to argue that the wealthy should be prohibited from dominat-
ing political speech. Judge J. Skelly Wright contends: "Unchecked
political expenditures, no less than crass regulation of ideas, may
drown opposing beliefs . . . . Limiting the amount that wealthy
interests may spend to publicize their views enhances the self-ex-
pression of individual citizens who lack wealth, furthering the val-
ues of freedom of speech." 90
83. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 44-51.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 49 n.55.
87. Id. at 48-49.
88. Id. at 32.
89. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 70, passim.
90. Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to
Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 636 (1982). Similarly, Rawls argues that the
wealthy should not be "permitted to use their advantages to control the course of public
debate." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 225 (1971). Dean Rosenthal asserts that "reduc-
ing inequities in the opportunities of candidates and their supporters to persuade the electo-
rate" is a "worthy" goal which is "not only consistent with but indispensable to the
attainment of the most fundamental purposes of the Constitution." Rosenthal, Campaign
Financing and the Constitution, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 360 (1970).
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In First National Bank v. Bellotti,9' the Court struck down re-
strictions on corporate contributions in referendum elections. Jus-
tice White in dissent suggested that the result might have been
different if a candidate election had been involved. 92 Justice White
said that even the majority might have approved restrictions to pre-
vent "corporate domination of the electoral process."93 He and Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall felt that such domination did exist in
Bellotti,94 but the majority disagreed."
If it could be shown that the political process had been distorted
by one group's domination, a narrowly drawn statute preventing a
wealthy candidate or interest group from overwhelming the opposi-
tion might survive constitutional challenge.96 Such a statute, how-
ever, "would require extraordinarily difficult determinations about
the specific effect of multiple communications in particular political
campaigns." 97 The same objective might be achieved by subsidizing
or otherwise enhancing the opposing voices rather than restricting
the dominant one. The result would be an increase rather than a
decrease in the quantity of speech.98 A narrowly drawn statute
designed to prevent a candidate's voice from being drowned out by
better financed opponents would have to permit wide disparity in
spending. A statute that restricts the speech of the dominant group
or enhances the speech of the weaker group with a goal of exactly
equalizing the voices would almost certainly be struck down.99
91. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
92. Id. at 820-21 (White, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 810 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White had argued earlier that Congress
had decided "that elections are to be decided among candidates none of whom has overpow-
ering advantage by reason of a huge campaign war chest." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 265 (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White believed that expenditure ceilings
were a permissible means of achieving this "acceptable purpose" so long as they were not
"plainly too low." Id. at 265-66.
94. 435 U.S. at 810-11 (White, J., dissenting).
95. The Court found that "there has been no showing that the relative voice of corpora-
tions has been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts."
Id. at 789. Perhaps the majority's best evidence on this point was that the voters rejected the
proposal in 1976 even though the corporations which opposed it were enjoined from contrib-
uting or expending any money against it. Id. at 789 n.28.
96. See Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565, 599-600 (1980).
97. Id. at 600.
98. This would avoid the restriction on the quantity of speech which the Court found
impermissible in Buckley. See 424 U.S. at 44-51. Public financing of candidates does not
"abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but . . . use[s] public money to facilitate and enlarge
public discussion." Id. at 92-93. But see Shiffrin, supra note 96, at 627 (criticizing the reason-
ing in Buckley and asserting that a subsidy to the less affluent candidate is no less objectiona-
ble on first amendment grounds than a restriction on the more affluent one).
99. Cf. Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv. 243,
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As a practical matter, equality of campaign funding cannot
be achieved without closing the independent expenditure loop-
hole." ° Independent expenditures by PACs supporting Reagan in
1980 destroyed the apparent equality of funding.'l t Up to now, in-
dependent expenditures by PACs have played a relatively minor
role. Only PACs unconnected with other organizations have en-
gaged in significant independent spending. If the corporate, trade
association, and labor PACs decide to make large independent ex-
penditures to avoid the $5,000 limit on contributions to candidates,
the amounts spent supporting candidates for the House and Senate
will increase astronomically. 102
So far, natural restraints have discouraged connected PACs
from using independent expenditures. 10 3 New constraints of cam-
paign finance law are likely to encourage or force connected PACs
or their sponsoring organizations to make independent
expenditures. o4
B. Lack of Accountability
1. Responsibility of Candidates for Campaign Contributions
"A group like ours could lie through its teeth and the candidate
279 ("The current crop of Justices do not find leveling off their affluent peers to be a particu-
larly attractive idea. It is not that they love the First Amendment more; they simply love
egalitarianism less.").
Justice Burger has opposed expansion of access to the media because it would be "so
heavily weighted in favor of the financially affluent." CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 123 (1973). However, Powe interprets the CBS decision as only resolving a conflict
between "one type of wealth (broadcasters) versus another type of wealth (those who could
afford to buy time)." Powe, supra, at 275 n.104.
100. See Fleishman, The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments: The Short-
comings of Good Intentions, 1975 DUKE L.J., 851, 880-82. Fleishman correctly forecast the
problems with regulating independent, anticandidate expenditures. Id. at 881. He also felt
that a limit on independent spending by individuals, even if constitutional, would not equalize
campaign finances because it would not control the number of individuals who might choose
to spend the limit. Id. at 880. Finally, he saw no way to control issue campaigns. Id. at 881-
82. Committees could run campaigns emphasizing issues with or without mentioning candi-
dates and have a substantial impact on elections without being subject to any constitutional
limits. Id. Interestingly, some of the largest PACs have used emotional issues to raise money
which they then use for legally unlimited anticandidate expenditures.
101. The Court approvingly noted in Buckley that acceptance of an expenditure ceiling
was a quid pro quo for public funding, and that candidates who elected not to take the public
funds were not subject to an expenditure limit. 424 U.S. at 95, 107-08.
102. Of the top ten PACs with respect to independent expenditures in 1982, seven were
unconnected and three were trade association PACs. None of the corporate or labor PACs
were among the top ten independent spenders. See supra note 61.
103. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 144-65 and accompanying text.
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it helps stays clean," 1 5 according to Terry Dolan, Chairman of
NCPAC, by far the largest independent spender among the
PACs."°6 Dolan's statement reinforces liberal fears that organiza-
tions such as NCPAC will use unfair and deceptive campaign tac-
tics to defeat Democrats while their Republican opponents escape
responsibility for the tactics.
A candidate who spends campaign funds to attack an opponent
is concerned about possible backlash if voters perceive the attack as
unfair. Until recently, Dolan and his adversaries felt that the candi-
date helped by negative independent spending could remain aloof
and bear no responsibility for the attacks on his opponent.
In 1982, Senator Paul Sarbanes, a liberal Democrat from Mary-
land, handily defeated Lawrence Hogan despite a massive negative
campaign by NCPAC. 10 7 That campaign demonstrated that Do-
lan's assessment was incorrect. NCPAC's strategy hurt Hogan,
whom it supported, because of popular backlash and because the
negative campaign made it easier for Sarbanes to raise money from
supporters.' °8 Hogan eventually denounced NCPAC 1°9 after
Sarbanes had made its support a major issue in the campaign.
The Sarbanes race illustrates that an independent spender can-
not be controlled by its intended beneficiary. In some ways the in-
tended beneficiary is in a worse position than the victim. Besides
using tactics which may give the victim a campaign issue, the in-
dependent spending PAC may articulate and emphasize issues
which the intended beneficiary wants to downplay or duck. To
maintain its independent position, the PAC could not discuss strat-
egy with the intended beneficiary or even respond to calls or letters
urging restraint. If the candidate urged the PAC to change its strat-
egy by making a public statement, he would risk alienating some of
his ardent individual supporters.
Victims of such attacks are not without weapons. The require-
ment that independent expenditures be disclosed110 makes it possi-
ble for a candidate like Sarbanes to make PAC spending an issue
and to link it with his opponent.
105. Running with the PACs, TIME, Oct. 25, 1982, at 20, 22.
106. In 1981-82, NCPAC spent nearly $3.2 million, over half of the total independent
spending and eight times as much as the second largest spender, Fund For a Conservative
Majority. See Independent Spending Increases, supra note 61, at 8.
107. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
108. See Running With the PACs, supra note 105, at 26.
109. Id.
110. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(4)(H)(iii) (1982).
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Incumbent victims of PAC negative spending may take other
defensive actions. In a 1982 complaint filed with the Federal Com-
munications Commission, NCPAC alleged that some of its intended
victims, incumbent Senators and Representatives, had used their in-
fluence to discourage broadcasters from airing NCPAC advertise-
ments."' 1 While NCPAC presented evidence that its targets had
influenced broadcasters to deny it access, NCPAC could identify no
111. NCPAC first filed a complaint against some candidates and their supporters, alleg-
ing attempts to intimidate broadcasters into refusing broadcast access to NCPAC. A few
months later, NCPAC filed another complaint, alleging denial of access by several broadcast
stations. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 89 F.C.C.2d 626 (1982).
The FCC concluded that NCPAC had no right of access to the media to broadcast its
views. Id. at 627-29. The Commission cited CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973), in which the Supreme Court held that broadcasters were not required to accept paid
editorial advertisements. In that case, the Court concluded that the FCC was justified in its
conclusion that "the public interest in having access to the marketplace of 'ideas and exper-
iences' would scarcely be served" by ordering a right of access to advertising time. Id. at 123.
Such a right, the Court feared, would mean that "the views of the affluent could well prevail
over those of others, since they would have it within their power to purchase time more
frequently." Id.
Having failed to get relief from the FCC, NCPAC filed an action in federal district court.
National Conservative Political Action Comm. v. Kennedy, 563 F. Supp. 622 (D.D.C. 1983).
The court dismissed NCPAC's suit against Senator Kennedy and others for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. at 623. That decision had the effect of uphold-
ing the earlier decision by the FCC with respect to the nonexistence of a right of access to the
media.
The court disposed of NCPAC's claim that several defendant members of Congress had
intimidated broadcasters. The court found that the communications the members had with
the broadcasters did not give rise to any actionable claim. Some of the defendants had alleg-
edly "advised [the broadcasters] not to accept the NCPAC advertisements" and others had
written memoranda to achieve the same result or "used the power and prestige of their fed-
eral offices to cause the stations to refuse the advertisements." Id. at 625.
NCPAC did not allege that the members had threatened any sort of retribution if the
broadcasters did carry the advertisements. Id. The court also observed that the members
had no executive powers to accomplish such retribution. Id. The warnings to the broadcast-
ers concerning potential legal action for defamation did not involve any threatened misuse of
official power. Id.
Despite the usual rules permitting alternative pleading, the court found the allegation that
the broadcasters and the members joined in a conspiracy to deny them air time to be inconsis-
tent with the allegation that the members intimidated the broadcasters. Id. The court con-
cluded that "the statements that the defendant Members of Congress are alleged to have
made to the broadcasters are functionally indistinguishable from statements that any person
could have made to the broadcasters under the protections of the first amendment." Id.
NCPAC suffered no constitutional harm and, according to the court, failed to show the nec-
essary governmental action upon which to base a claim under the first and fifth amendments.
Id. at 626.
Though NCPAC may have had a basis for its assertions that the members of Congress
pressured the broadcasters into refusing the advertisements, NCPAC failed to find a viable
remedy to protect itself against such conduct. Perhaps it was not unfair pressure but simply
the broadcasters' exercise of good judgment, which the first amendment protects, that pre-
vented NCPAC from placing the advertisements.
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federal right infringed by the alleged intimidation." 12 Moreover,
NCPAC lost its claim to a right of access to the broadcast media to
air its views. 11
3
The rise of independent spending by PACs threatens candidates
with loss of control over their campaigns. If the connected PACs or
their union and corporate sponsors begin to use this tactic aggres-
sively, independent spending for media advertising could dwarf can-
didate spending. That could distort the messages voters receive
about the qualifications and positions of candidates since candi-
dates' presentations of themselves and their ideas will not be able to
overcome PAC static.
2. Responsiveness to Constituents and Party
The PAC phenomenon makes politicians less accountable to
their constituents and political parties. National fundraising by
PACs allows a candidate to finance a campaign without much local
financial support. A candidate may find it necessary to take posi-
tions on issues of interest to the PACs whose favor he seeks rather
than on issues of most concern to his constituents.
114
Political parties can provide only a small portion of the neces-
sary funds for a congressional race.11' Large PAC contributions
further reduce candidates' incentive to seek party money. 1 6 Rais-
ing money by cultivating PACs,rather than wealthy constituents or
112. 563 F. Supp. at 624-27.
113. See id. at 627; cf. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1973) (in
declining to find that the refusal of the broadcasters to sell time to NCPAC was governmental
action for the purposes of the first amendment, the Court said: "[I]t would be anomalous for
us to hold, in the name of promoting the constitutional guarantees of free expression, that the
day-to-day editorial decisions of broadcast licensees are subject to the kind of restraints urged
by respondents.").
114. See Adamany, PAC's and the Democratic Financing of Politics, 22 ARIZ. L. REV.
569, 596 (1980); Wright, supra note 90, at 619-20. Of course, raising campaign money na-
tionally was common even before the rise of the PACs. See D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION 39 (1974).
115. Of the total receipts of more than $76 million for Senate campaigns in 1981-82, only
about $800,000 was contributed by major party organizations. 1981-1982 FEC SENATE AND
HousE CAMPAIGNS REPORT, supra note 78, at 55, 64. In House campaigns in the same
period, the total receipts were about $99 million while major party contributions totaled just
over $2.5 million. Id. at 56, 66. FECA's limits on individual and party committee contribu-
tions have made PACs an alternative and effective source of funds, weakening the role of
political parties. See Epstein, The PAC Phenomenon: An Overview, 22 ARIZ. L. REv. 360-61
(1980).
116. One respected political columnist has suggested "channeling much more of the
money (including. . .all general election spending) through the respective party committees,
rather than through individual candidates' treasuries." D. BRODER, THE PARTY'S OVER 256
(1971).
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party leaders, means that campaigns will be financed largely by spe-
cial interest group money because most PACs are connected with
these groups.
Ideologically focused, unaffiliated PACs tend to do the most in-
dependent spending. 17 These PACs do not raise their funds from
members of a trade association, stockholders of a corporation, or
members of a union but from individuals who strongly support a
particular issue or group of issues. The influence of interest groups,
including ideologically focused PACs, is beneficial in some ways.
Ideological PACs are more likely clearly to reflect the political
views of their individual contributors than are PACs associated
with unions, corporations, or trade associations. Contributors give
to ideological PACs because they promote a few narrow political
issues of particular interest to the donors.
By contrast, contributors give to union, corporate, or trade asso-
ciation PACs to advance the special interests of the group as per-
ceived by the PAC managers. These PACs sometimes support
candidates who are receptive to the group's special interest but
whose political positions on other issues are inconsistent with the
views of individual contributors. Peer pressure and subtle coercion
also may induce members of a group to contribute to affiliated
PACs.1 18
Legislators always have been concerned about raising campaign
funds and about avoiding issues which make it easier for an oppo-
nent to raise funds.1" 9 Candidates who incur the wrath of special
interest groups are hurt whether or not the special interest group
has a PAC. For example, being identified as a member of the
117. Only three of the ten PACs that did the most independent spending in 1982 were
connected with other organizations. The American Medical Association's (AMA) PAC
spent about $212,000 and the Realtors PAC spent $188,000. The National Rifle Association
(NRA) Political Victory Fund spent $235,000. The NRA PAC is connected to a single-issue,
ideological organization rather than a trade association and is more like NCPAC and other
nonconnected PACs than the AMA and Realtors' PACs. Together, the three PACs spent
only about 20% of the amount spent by NCPAC ($635,000 to $3.2 million). See supra note
61.
118. Congressional concern about coercion of contributors by corporate and union PACs
was reflected in the rules that were enacted to prevent it. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(3) (1982).
The FEC has promulgated rules to carry out the mandate of the statute in this area. I 1
C.F.R. § 114.5(a) (1984). The proscription of coercion illustrates the concern but can hardly
be expected to eliminate the problem because of the subtle and unprovable sanctions which
unions and corporations can impose on noncontributors.
119. See D. MAYHEW, supra note 114, at 61-73. Mayhew suggests that for most con-
gressmen the best strategy is conservative. They should "cling to their own positions of the
past when possible and. . . reach for new ones with great caution where necessary." Id. at
67.
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"Dirty Dozen" by environmental groups could be quite damaging
to a candidate even if the environmentalists had no PAC that could
contribute or spend independently. 20
It may be easier for potential candidates to appeal to PACs for
contributions than to achieve the visibility necessary to spur the in-
terest of individuals who make contributions. However, candidates
cannot directly approach a PAC to seek assistance in the form of
independent spending. Direct contact between the candidate and
the PAC is impermissible if spending is to be classified as independ-
ent.121 Further, the candidate who receives support from PAC in-
dependent spending must live with the required disclosure of PAC
spending.1 22
Both major political parties are concerned about the accounta-
bility of independent spending, especially negative spending, by
PACs.12 However, they have made no progress toward a solution.
C. Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption
Prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption is
the only governmental interest which the Supreme Court has found
sufficient to justify restrictions on speech in campaign financing reg-
ulation. In Buckley v. Valeo,'24 the Court held the risk of corrup-
tion justified limits on contributions to candidates but that
120. Mobil Oil Company has run newspaper advertisements comparing the political ac-
tivities of Common Cause with those of the business PACs whose spending Common Cause
would like to see regulated. E.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1984, at A31, col. 4. Mobil asserts
that "[b]oth PACs and Common Cause spring from the concept that like-minded voters can
be politically more effective by banding together." Id. Mobil attributes the interest of Com-
mon Cause's leadership in the regulation of PACs to an antibusiness bias combined with the
increase in the number of business PACs. See id. This antibusiness bias is unstated and
inconsistent with the views of many Common Cause supporters, according to Mobil. See id.
Environmental Action, the group which names the "Dirty Dozen" and tries to engineer
their defeat in congressional elections, has done independent spending in those races rather
than contributing to the favored candidates. Vote Results Mixed on the Environment, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 7, 1976, at 35, col. 1. Ironically, in 1974 with a budget of only $30,000, the
group saw 8 of its 12 targets defeated. Id. In 1976, only 3 of 12 targets lost despite an
expenditure total of over $100,000. Id. The publicity generated by news stories about the
campaigns of the "Dirty Dozen" probably has more impact on voters, workers, and contribu-
tors than independent spending for advertising. Environmental Action spent some of the
money on organization in the districts affected rather than on advertising. See id. Environ-
mental Action stopped independent spending in 1976 because of its difficulty in maintaining
independence from favored candidates. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 398.
121. See supra note 2.
122. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(6)(B) (1982).
123. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 388.
124. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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expenditures did not present such a risk.'25 In First National Bank
v. Bellotti,'26 the Court struck down a statute barring corporate
contributions in referendum elections because of the absence of a
corruption risk. 27 The Court suggested that a ban on corporate
contributions, or even independent expenditures by corporations,
might be justified in candidate elections because of the need to pre-
vent candidate corruption.1 28
More recently, in California Medical Association v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission,'29 the Court upheld the $5,000 limit on contribu-
tions to multicandidate PACs. The California Medical Association
decision was surprising because the only risk of corruption was indi-
rect. 130 Four Justices felt that a contribution to a PAC should re-
ceive less first amendment protection than a contribution to a
candidate. 3 ' The PAC contribution was seen as "speech by
proxy," while a contribution to a candidate was the contributor's
direct speech.132 Justice Blackmun joined those four Justices in up-
holding the statute but rejected the "speech by proxy" theory. 33
Justice Blackmun saw potential corruption in the multicandidate
PACs serving as "conduits for contributions to candidates."'134 He
suggested that the $5,000 limit on contributions to PACs might be
unconstitutional if applied to a PAC which did only independent
spending. 3 5 If there is no risk of corruption involved in direct in-
dependent spending, as Buckley indicates, there could hardly be a
corruption risk if the money is spent indirectly by contributing to a
PAC which buys the air time.
After Bellotti and California Medical Association, it appears that
the Court will subject political contributions to the same first
amendment scrutiny as expenditures-upholding contribution lim-
its only when there is a risk of corruption or apparent corruption of
125. Id. at 25-30, 45-46.
126. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
127. Id. at 788-92.
128. Id. at 788 n.26.
129. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
130. Id. at 197-99 & n.19 (plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun concurred in part of the
plurality opinion by Justice Marshall and concurred in the judgment, but did not join in the
plurality's first amendment analysis. Id. at 201-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
131. Id. at 196 (plurality opinion).
132. Id. at 196-97 (plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 202 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
134. Id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
135. Id.
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candidates.136 It is argued that PACs, by aggregating small contri-
butions, can spend much more than individuals and have more in-
fluence on candidates and elections, thus at least appearing to
corrupt them. 137 However, a wealthy individual such as General
Motors heir Stewart Mott may buy $100,000 of air time for a favor-
ite liberal candidate. Permitting Mott to buy that much air time,
while preventing thousands of small contributors from giving to a
PAC to do the same thing, unfairly favors the rich. 138
The corruption rationale may justify limits on contributions to
PACs and on contributions from PACs to candidates. It does not
justify restraints on PAC independent spending. Indeed, the cor-
ruption rationale does not justify the existing prohibition of in-
dependent expenditures by corporations and labor unions. 139 Since
Bellotti, even the prohibition of contributions by corporations and
unions is constitutionally suspect. In his dissent in Bellotti, Justice
White said that the Court had "reserve[d] the formal interment of
the Corrupt Practices Act [which bars corporate and union contri-
butions and expenditures] . . .for another day.' He is correct.
The Court will be hard-pressed to distinguish the corruption risk
posed by contributions from union or corporate treasuries or of-
ficers from that posed by contributions of up to $5,000 from the
union or corporate PAC. The union or corporate officers have de
facto control over contributions from all three sources, 141 but only
use of treasury money is barred.
Obviously, if the risk of corruption cannot sustain a ban on con-
tributions by unions and corporations it certainly cannot sustain the
ban on independent expenditures. The Supreme Court would have
136. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (striking down
municipal ordinance which imposed a $250 limit on contributions to committees which sup-
ported or opposed ballot issues); Richards, The Rise and Fall of the Contribu-
tion/Expenditure Distinction: Redefining the Acceptable Range of Campaign Finance
Reforms, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 367, 393 (1983). Perhaps the proxy speech theory advanced
by the plurality in California Medical Association was just an indirect way of permitting gov-
ernment to attempt to equalize political voices, something a majority of the court has never
endorsed. Powe, supra note 99, at 259-60.
137. Note, supra note 42, at 696-700.
138. Powe, supra note 99, at 267.
139. Corporations and labor unions are forbidden from making "a contribution or expen-
diture in connection with" a federal election. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1982). FEC regulations
provide that a separate segregated fund created by a corporation or union may make in-
dependent expenditures but that the corporation or union itself may not. 11 C.F.R.
§ 109.1(a), (b)(1), (c) (1984).
140. 435 U.S. at 821 (White, J., dissenting).
141. See Nicholson, The Constitutionality of the Federal Restrictions on Corporate and
Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 945, 993 (1980).
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to repudiate past statements about corruption risks or develop a
new rationale to uphold the prohibition on independent expendi-
tures.14 The Court already has rejected the need to protect dissi-
dent union members or shareholders against the use of union or
corporate treasury funds to support candidates whom they op-
pose.143 It is likely, then, that the PACs and their sponsoring orga-
nizations can by independent expenditures continue to circumvent
ill-conceived restrictions on direct participation by unions and cor-
porations in the political process.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH "REFORM" PROPOSALS
A. "Reforms" That Could Stimulate Independent Spending
Proposals to curb the power of PACs usually include public fi-
nancing for House and Senate campaigns, 1" and accompanying
limits on candidate expenditures in those campaigns. 145  Others
would limit campaign spending indirectly: one recently introduced
bill would give favorable tax treatment to contributors to candidates
142. See, e.g., 1 T. SCHWARZ & A. STRAUS, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FI-
NANCE AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY § 2.06(1) (1984); Birnbaum, The Constitutionality of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act After First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28 AM. U.L.
REV. 149, 172-74 (1979); Nicholson, supra note 141, at 988-94.
143. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794-95.
The remedies for aggrieved shareholders may be more theoretical than real. See Nichol-
son, supra note 141, at 961 n.72 and sources cited therein. Of course, if corporations begin to
do large amounts of political spending, the attitudes of shareholders and the courts could
change dramatically.
As for union members' rights, see Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977);
Comment, The Regulation of Union Political Activity: Majority and Minority Rights and
Remedies, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 386 (1977). In Abood, the Court concluded that if a union
spends "for the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the
advancement of ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining represen-
tative," it must finance such expenditures "from charges, dues, or assessments paid by em-
ployees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so
. . . by the threat of loss of governmental employment." 431 U.S. at 235-36. The plaintiffs
alleged that the union made political expenditures from service fees. Nonmembers of the
union must pay service fees if they are represented by the union in collective bargaining. The
Court ruled that if the plaintiffs established the facts alleged upon remand to the trial court,
the court could order restitution of the portion of the compulsory charges used for political
purposes to which they objected and a reduction in future charges by that percentage. Id. at
240.
144. E.g., H.R. 2490, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H1992 (daily ed. Apr. 12,
1983) (public financing of general elections for House); S. 85, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REC. S91 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) (public financing of general elections for Senate); E.
DREW, supra note 49, at 147-56 (public financing of general elections for both houses of
Congress).
145. E.g., H.R. 2490, supra note 144, § 7; S. 85, supra note 144, § 3.
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who agree in advance to limit expenditures. 146
Restrictions on PAC contributions also could curtail PAC
power. Some proposals do not reduce the limit on a PAC contribu-
tion to a candidate but instead reduce the total amount a candidate
could accept from all multicandidate PACs in a particular cam-
paign.147 These proposed reforms are unlikely to reduce the PAC
money spent on Senate and House races since PACs can easily
evade the limits by making independent expenditures.
Restrictions imposed by the federal campaign law motivated the
substantial independent expenditures of pro-Reagan PACs in the
1980 election. First, contributions to Reagan and Carter for the
general election were illegal, 148 but many people wished to contrib-
ute. Second, by accepting public funding, Reagan agreed to a
spending limit that was unrealistically low 4 9 for a challenge to an
incumbent president.' 50 Reagan supporters created PACs to collect
contributions and use the money independently to support the Rea-
gan candidacy. However, the PACs raised less than they ex-
pected.' 5 1 Many individuals who supported Reagan may have
declined to contribute to the PACs because the campaign received
public funds. Further, the uncertain legality of independent spend-
146. H.R. 4428, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2-3, 129 CONG. Rac. H10,056 (daily ed. Nov.
16, 1983). The bill provides for a $100 tax credit ($200 for a joint return) for a contribution
to a "qualified" candidate (one who agrees to spending limits) for the House of Representa-
tives, and a $200 total tax credit ($400 for a joint return) for all contributions to qualified
candidates.
147. E.g., H.R. 4428, supra note 146, § 7; H.R. 2959, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4, 129
CONG. REc. H2784 (daily ed. May 10, 1983); H.R. 2490, supra note 144, § 6.
148. 26 U.S.C. § 9012(b) (1982).
149. Both candidates for president in 1972, the last privately financed general election,
spent far more than the amount the candidates were permitted to spend in 1980. Nixon spent
$61 million while McGovern spent $30 million. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 70, at 104.
Eight years of inflation later, the 1980 spending limit was only slightly over $29 million. See
supra note 10.
150.
If incumbents and challengers are both held to the same dollar limitations...
challengers will inevitably be disadvantaged by the incumbents' pre-existing name
recognition, campaign organization, media access, and the publicly provided staff,
services, and supplies available to all office-holders. . . . Moreover, because high
expenditures constitute the principal means of attack on incumbents by challengers,
the lower the expenditure ceilings, the greater the amount of discrimination.
Fleishman, supra note 100, at 878-79. Cf Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending in
Congressional Elections, 72 AM. POL. Sci. RFv. 469, 489 (1978) (concluding that "any re-
form measure which decreases spending by the candidates will favor incumbents").
An important consequence of inadequate funding is that the candidates concentrate on
media advertising and ignore field operations and other activities which reach voters directly.
This may contribute to voter apathy and low voter turnouts. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 70,
at 104 (commenting on the inadequacy of funding for the 1976 presidential general election).
151. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 316-19; Note, supra note 42, at 687.
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ing hampered the PACs' efforts.15 2 This uncertainty led the Carter
campaign actively to discourage independent spending for fear it
would count toward Carter's spending limit.15 3 Despite raising less
than expected, PACs increased media exposure for candidate Rea-
gan far beyond the level that would have been reached with public
funds alone. 154
Congress apparently recognized the inadequacy of the public
funding scheme for presidential elections. Rather than increase the
funding level or permit contributions in the general election, Con-
gress created a loophole. Amendments passed in 1979 permitted
the political parties to collect "soft money," funds which cannot be
used directly to support federal candidates but can be used for local
"party-building activities." Congress designed the amendments to
allow state and local party committees to pay for voter registration
and get-out-the-vote activities as well as campaign materials sup-
portive of the party's whole slate.' 55 These activities inevitably ben-
efit federal candidates. 156 The Reagan campaign's exploitation of
soft money enlarged the loophole until it was "big enough to drive a
President through."' 15 7
The loophole allows corporate and union treasury funds and in-
dividual contributions exceeding the federal contribution limit to be
given to state and local party organizations. As a result, corpora-
tions and unions gravitate to party organizations in states where
their contributions are legal.' 58 These contributions are not subject
to federal disclosure rules because the contributor gives the money
to a state or local party committee. Federal limits and disclosure
rules apply only to the portion of the committee's funds allocated to
federal candidates. The committee must have enough contributions
in conformity with federal law to cover that portion of its
expenditures. 59
Democrats thought this change would help unions and their
candidates. However, they were wrong again. Republicans quickly
perfected methods of steering national contributions to states where
152. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 316.
153. Id. at 338.
154. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
155. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(v), (x), (xii), 431(9)(B)(iv), (vii), (ix) (1982). For a very helpful
discussion of these provisions, see 1 T. SCHWARZ & A. STRAUS, supra note 142, § 5.04.
156. E. DREW, supra note 49, at 101-02.
157. Id. at 99.
158. Id. at 104.
159. 1 T. SCHWARZ & A. STRAUS, supra note 142, § 5.04.
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they were legal and needed.16 State and local committees spent
$15 million to help Reagan. The Republican National Committee
raised nearly $9 million and steered it to the state and local
groups. 16 ' The Democratic National Committee was much less
successful. Of $4 million spent to help Carter, only $1.3 million
was raised nationally. 62
Soft money played a prominent and poorly disclosed role in the
1984 election,' 63 overshadowing independent spending by PACs
and further damaging the public financing scheme for presidential
elections. The success of soft money drives indicates that much pri-
vate money will be contributed to presidential campaigns whether
or not direct contributions are permitted.
Similarly, if a public funding law imposes expenditure limits on
House and Senate races, independent spending PACs will evade the
limits in at least some campaigns. Evasion is more likely if the ex-
penditure limits are unrealistically low. It may, however, be more
difficult for large national PACs to raise and spend money in Senate
and House races. These races focus more on local issues and re-
quire a more localized approach to fundraising.
Restrictive contribution limits and public financing could lead
corporations and labor unions to use treasury funds for independent
expenditures to support candidates. To preserve their influence,
corporations and labor unions might return to under-the-table con-
tributions' 64 or attack the constitutionally suspect rules that bar
their independent expenditures.165
Such reforms would not eliminate PAC influence, but instead
160. E. DREW, supra note 49, at 102-05.
161. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 301-02.
162. Id. at 327. However, Carter did benefit from about five times as much spending as
Reagan in communication costs. That category covers spending by corporations and unions
to urge their shareholders and members to support candidates. Unions did much more of this
sort of spending than businesses. Alexander, The Regulation and Funding of Presidential
Elections, I J.L. & POL. 43, 57-58 (1983).
163. See Fat Cats: Election Laws Change Campaign Role of Rich But Don't Diminish It,
Wall St. 3., Oct. 24, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
164. Illegal corporate contributions were prominent in the Watergate scandal and many
of them were apparently coerced by persons working for the Nixon campaign. See H. ALEX-
ANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM 112-26 (1st
ed. 1976); Nicholson, supra note 141, at 993 n.205. Professor Winter observes that "the
outlawing of contributions now lawful [by prohibiting all contributions to presidential candi-
dates] seems a peculiar way of reducing contributions now unlawful-unless it is believed
that federal subsidies will eliminate the temptation to solicit corporate contributions." R.
WINTER, WATERGATE AND THE LAW 16 (1974).
165. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
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would stimulate independent spending by PACs and other partici-
pants in the political process.
B. Creating a Right to Reply to Negative Advertising
A candidate whose record, qualifications, or positions on issues
are challenged by his opponent may assert a right to respond.' 66
However, a candidate may not respond to a media campaign by an
independent spender, unless the campaign attacks his personal in-
tegrity or character. 167 Consequently, some have suggested a mech-
anism to give a candidate the opportunity to respond to an
independent spending campaign. Such a response could be pro-
vided in several ways. First, the candidate could be given a right to
buy media space or air time using his available funds. Second, the
candidate could be given free space or air time by the medium used
by the independent spender. Finally, the candidate could be given
public funds to pay for the response.
Each of these alternatives has serious defects. A statute giving
federal candidates a right to reasonable access to air time has been
upheld as a constitutional balancing of first amendment rights of
broadcasters and candidates.' 68 However, the Supreme Court has
rejected arguments that the first amendment requires a specific right
166. The equal time doctrine requires stations to allow equal opportunities for the use of
the broadcast medium to all legally qualified candidates for the same office. 47 U.S.C. § 315
(1982); W. FRANCOIS, MASS MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 580-81 (1982). Under a 1970
decision known as the Zapple rule, the equal time principle was extended to require a station
which allows the authorized spokesmen of one candidate to use the station to allow equal
time to the spokesmen of the opposing candidate. In re Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707
(1970) (reaffirmed in In re Complaints of Comm. for Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Is-
sues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283 (1970)). Unless the equal time rule or the Zapple rule applies, the
more general fairness doctrine controls access to the media. It requires stations to devote a
reasonable amount of time to controversial public issues and to allow opportunities for airing
contrasting views, but grants no specific right to respond to any particular broadcast. See
The Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969); W. FRANCOIS, supra, at 593-96.
167. To implement the fairness doctrine, the FCC promulgated personal attack and polit-
ical editorializing rules. These rules require a licensee to allow a candidate to respond over
the station's facilities if his character or integrity is attacked by someone other than the op-
posing candidate (or his authorized spokesmen), 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1910, 73.1920 (1983), or by
a station editorial, 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1910, 73.1930 (1983). W. FRANCOIS, supra note 166, at
596-99. This is the only FCC rule providing for a response to an independent spender.
The FCC is now considering repeal of the rules on personal attacks and political editorial-
izing and of the fairness doctrine itself. See 48 Fed. Reg. 28,295 (1983) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. pt. 73) (proposed June 21, 1983); 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317 (1984) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. pt. 73) (proposed May 14, 1984).
168. The FCC has the power to revoke a station license or construction permit "for will-
ful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable
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of access or right to respond because of the first amendment rights
of broadcasters' 69 and the printed press.
170
A specific statutory right for a candidate to respond in the
broadcast media to an independent spender might be upheld. Such
a right to reply would not be asserted as frequently as a general
right of access and would be less of a burden. 171
Even if a right to respond existed, funds might not be available
to counter the advertising done by the independent spender. The
second alternative would require the print medium or broadcaster
to provide free space or air time,1 72 and is even more suspect under
amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for
Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982).
The Supreme Court upheld this "reasonable access" requirement against a constitutional
challenge by the networks. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). The FCC received a com-
plaint from the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee concerning the refusal of all three
networks to sell the committee air time for a 30-minute program. Id. at 367. The FCC ruled
that the networks had violated their obligation to provide reasonable access and "directed the
networks to state, by a certain date, how they intended to fulfill that statutory obligation."
Id. at 368. The Supreme Court affirmed the FCC order. The Court held that the statute
clearly provided an enforceable right of "reasonable access" for individual candidates. Id. at
377-86. The Court concluded that the FCC had not abused its discretion by deciding that the
networks had violated their obligation to provide reasonable access. Id. at 394. The Court
also rejected the broadcasters' argument that their first amendment rights were infringed by
the statute as implemented by the FCC. Id. The Court held that "the statutory right of
access, as defined by the Commission and applied in these cases, properly balances the First
Amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcasters." Id. at 397.
169. Indeed, in CBS v. FCC, the Court emphasized that under 42 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)
(1982) broadcasters make the specific decisions about what to broadcast. The FCC's role is
only to judge whether they have "considered the relevant factors in good faith." 453 U.S. at
396. In CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., the Court considered the right of access issue and
concluded that neither the first amendment nor the Federal Communications Act required
broadcasters to accept paid editorial advertisements even though they accepted commercial
advertisements. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The FCC had refused to require the licensee to change
its policy with respect to editorial advertisements and simply allowed the licensee "broad
discretion to decide how . . . [its] obligation [to provide balanced coverage of issues and
events] will be met." Id. at 118-19. The Court did not reach the question whether the first
amendment or the Act might bar the FCC from requiring licensees to reconsider the policy of
refusing editorial advertisements. Id. at 119.
The Court's 1981 decision in CBS v. FCC, however, upheld the statutory right of "reason-
able access" for candidates seeking federal elective offices, indicating support for a limited
right of reasonable access to the broadcast media. The issue now is the distance Congress and
the FCC can go to require broadcasters to provide access.
170. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court struck
down a Florida "right to reply" statute which required a newspaper to give a political candi-
date equal space to reply to critical comments about his character or record. The Court
concluded that the first amendment barred the governmental intrusion into the editorial pro-
cess which was required by the statute. Id. at 256-58.
171. Note, Making Campaign Finance Law Enforceable, supra note 54, at 393.
172. The clean campaign bill introduced by Democratic Representative David R. Obey
would amend the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982), to provide that if a
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the first amendment because of the additional burdens it imposes on
the media. This proposal would make it difficult, if not impossible,
for NCPAC to buy air time. Broadcasters would avoid the obliga-
tion to provide free reply time by not carrying an independent
spender's advertisement in the first place.173
Finally, public funding could pay for the candidate's re-
sponse.174 This alternative may avoid infringement of the media's
constitutional rights if they retain discretion to accept or reject the
response but raises another issue: whether a candidate attacked by
an independent spending PAC just before an election will be able to
convince the FEC of his right to respond and obtain funding for
such a response in time to counter the PAC's assault. Legislators
would have to solve these kinds of problems for public funding to be
a viable method of financing the candidate's response to negative
advertising. In light of the Court's approval in Buckley v. Valeot75
of the public financing scheme for the presidential general elec-
broadcast licensee sells an independent spender air time "to support a candidate or to criticize
the views, positions, actions, or qualifications of a candidate," the licensee must provide equal
time without charge to the candidate opposed or criticized by the independent spender. H.R.
2490, supra note 144, § 8. A bill amending the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
sponsored by Democratic Representative Lee H. Hamilton, contains a similar provision.
H.R. 2959, supra note 147, § 10.
173. If broadcasters chose not to sell time to independent spenders, Common Cause and
liberal politicians would not be disappointed since most of the independent spending is done
by conservative groups. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. NCPAC and the other
PACs would probably be without an effective remedy. See supra note 111 and accompanying
text. The existing statutory right of "reasonable access" benefits only candidates. See 47
U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982) (reasonable access for legally qualified candidates for federal office).
174. In addition to requiring that broadcasters provide free, equal time for replies to
independent spenders, Representative Obey's bill provides that if independent expenditures
"in opposition to, or on behalf of an opponent of, a candidate" total more than $5,000, the
candidate is to receive public funds equal to the total of the independent expenditures. H.R.
2490, supra note 144, § 2. The candidate could choose to receive public funds equal to the
value of the free air time itself under this bill. Id. § 2. Apparently, a candidate could not
collect funds equal to those spent by an independent spender for air time and also choose to
take the money equivalent of the free air time, since the bill provides that the payments under
the first section "shall not duplicate" the payments under the second section. Id. A candi-
date may be able to take a subsidy equal to the amount spent by independent spenders (so
long as the total is over $5,000) and use the free air time which the broadcast licensee must
provide. Id. §§ 2, 8.
Another bill provides public funding of Senate races by matching certain contributions
received by the candidates. The bill would suspend the expenditure limit and provide addi-
tional matching funds to a candidate opposed by substantial independent spending. S. 85,
supra note 144, §§ 2-3. A candidate qualifies for the higher limit and supplemental funds if
total independent expenditures in the race exceed one-third of the expenditure limit and no
more than one-third of those expenditures supported that candidate. Id. The maximum
supplemental funding is 50% of the original expenditure limit. Id. § 2.
175. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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tion, 176 a public funding system appears to comply with the first
amendment. This system, like that in Buckley, would not "abridge,
restrict, or censor speech, but rather. . . [would] use public money
to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the
electoral process." 177
However, this subsidy may be considered "government speech
in support of specific candidates . . . which cannot be reconciled
with the First Amendment." 178 As long as the legislation provides
a subsidy without restricting or regulating the speech for which the
subsidy pays, the speech arguably belongs to the candidate not the
government. Still, government funds would be subsidizing speech
with which many taxpayers disagree. In contrast to Buckley, the
government would be taking a partisan political position to equalize
the candidates' strength rather than providing funds to all candi-
dates to facilitate political discussion. Moreover, providing a sub-
sidy to a candidate attacked by an independent spender could be
unfair to the other candidate, who had no control over the speech
triggering the reply.
Allowing government aid to one candidate provides opportuni-
ties for those in control of the FEC to misuse their power to en-
hance the election prospects of their favorite candidates. The FEC
is likely to protect major party candidates against attacks but is less
likely to protect minor party candidates.179
The more discretion left to the agency administering the sub-
sidy, the more the plan could raise problems similar to those raised
by government censorship or spending limits. Giving extra money
to a candidate's adversary could have an effect comparable to cen-
sorship of the candidate's message or a limit on his expenditures.
These burdens will be imposed only on candidates who purportedly
have benefited from independent spending by a PAC, but the
PAC-not the candidate-will have chosen and communicated the
176. Id. at 90-108.
177. Id. at 92-93.
178. Shiffrin, supra note 96, at 602.
179. FEC membership is divided equally between the two major parties. There is no
requirement that minor parties be represented. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1)-(2) (1982). Minor
party leaders have often complained that the major parties have designed the campaign fi-
nance laws and other election laws to prevent minor parties from increasing their power. See,
e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 33-35, 94-104 (Senator Buckley, elected as a minor party candidate
to Senate, and others complaining about discrimination against minor parties in FECA); An-
derson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564 (1983) (minor party presidential candidate challenging
Ohio filing deadline for independent candidates and new parties).
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message which triggers the subsidized reply.' 80
The potential dangers of selective funding of candidates out-
weigh the governmental interest in equal access to the media, an
interest which finds little support among the members of the
Supreme Court. 8 1 Furthermore, proposals that provide candidates
an opportunity to respond to an independent spending campaign
are impractical and of questionable constitutionality.
IV. "REFORMS" TO DISCOURAGE INDEPENDENT SPENDING
BY PACs
A. Preserving Natural Restraints to Limit Independent Spending
by PA Cs
Reform-minded legislators seldom anticipate the consequences
of their efforts. As it became clear that the campaign finance laws
of the 1970's, as modified by the Supreme Court, were ineffective to
control campaign spending, legislators proposed additional "re-
forms." '82 Because of their effect on campaigns, it is unlikely that a
Congress not controlled by either party will enact substantial
changes.
Independent spending by PACs creates a difficult problem for
reformers; because of current constitutional doctrine, it is nearly
impossible to regulate directly. Furthermore, many of the proposed
reforms could have drastic consequences, some intended and some
unintended. Fortunately, few serious problems exist with the cur-
rent system.
First, PACs have done little independent spending, except for
the 1980 presidential campaign. Second, natural restraints have
kept most PACs from making independent expenditures for or
against candidates.
180. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems cre-
ated when a candidate loses control of his campaign.
181. This selective subsidy may be weaker constitutionally than the general funding of
presidential campaigns. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 248-51 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-4 (1978); Ziegler, Government Speech and the Con-
stitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REv. 578, 609 (1980). The use of tax
money to subsidize partisan speech is almost indistinguishable from a union's use of dues
money for speech with which union members disagree, a practice found unconstitutional in
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The constitutionality of this action is
particularly suspect since the only government interest which can be advanced is equalizing
debate.
182. E.g., H.R. 4428, supra note 146; H.R. 2959, supra note 147; H.R. 2876, 98th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 129 CONG. Rtc. H2599-600 (daily ed. May 3, 1983); H.R. 2490, supra note 144; S.
911, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S3796 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983); S. 85, supra note
144.
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PACS which are not affiliated with any union, corporation, or
trade association have made most of the reported independent ex-
penditures. Connected PACs have far greater resources as a group
but have used them to make contributions rather than independent
expenditures.
Several factors may explain PACs' preference for contributions
over independent expenditures. If PACs lack the funds to contrib-
ute the maximum $5,000 to a candidate, they have little reason to
make an independent expenditure for the candidate.183 Further,
contributions are the time-honored, permissible way to reward poli-
ticians for past support and to obtain future support. A connected
PAC must bear a name which identifies its related union, corpora-
tion, or trade association.184 As a result, it is possible to identify
interest groups which support various candidates by checking re-
quired disclosure reports. 185 Connected PACs want a candidate to
know the source of their funds. However, both the group and the
candidate may believe that disclosure of unusually heavy financial
support, in the form of independent expenditures exceeding the
$5,000 limit on contributions, will harm the candidate's electoral
hopes. In addition, the PAC may damage its relationship with the
adverse political party or irritate many of its contributors by invest-
ing too much in one candidate. By limiting its financial commit-
ment to $5,000, the PAC does what its contributors and the
politicians of both parties expect it to do and does not risk alienat-
ing either group.
As long as the PAC chooses to make only contributions, no can-
didate can complain of inadequate support if he receives the maxi-
mum legal contribution. If connected PACs began to make
substantial independent expenditures, they would risk disappointing
candidates who expect support above the $5,000 contribution limit.
PACs, therefore, can rely on the contribution limit to keep all sup-
ported candidates equally happy and to stay within their campaign
budgets. Moreover, PACs and their affiliated interest groups pre-
serve the option of active and direct nonmonetary support of their
favored candidates. The sponsoring organization can supply can-
183. PACs probably wield less economic power than their opponents fear. Even the con-
nected PACs, which may have the sponsoring organization pay some administrative costs,
spend one-third of contributed funds for administration. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 8,
at 129-31.
184. 2 U.S.C. § 432(e)(5) (1982).
185. PACs are required to report by 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(4) (1982). The candidates' com-
mittees are required to report by 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(2) (1982) (House and Senate candidates)
or 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(3) (1982) (presidential candidates).
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paign volunteers, including some with political, legal or fundraising
expertise, 186 and can spend large sums directly from its treasury for
political communications to members or shareholders. These com-
munication costs are not treated as contributions or independent
expenditures and are not subject to disclosure requirements as long
as they are nonpartisan.'87 The independent spending PAC and its
sponsor cannot engage in these activities since they need to main-
tain their independent status so their expenditures will not be
counted as contributions.
B. Channeling Funds Away From Independent Spending
Restrictions on contributions to and from PACs and on candi-
dates' spending are difficult to sustain, and may have the counter-
productive effect of generating more independent expenditures.
Some proposals that avoid contribution restraints could, how-
ever, reduce or freeze the current level of PAC independent expend-
itures. The most obvious remedy is a substantial increase in
funding and expenditure limits for the presidential elections; even
after adjustment for inflation, these limits have always been too
low.188 So long as the spending limit is perceived to be inadequate,
PACs will spend large amounts independently, especially if contri-
butions to presidential candidates continue to be barred.
Another solution would be to increase all contribution limits.
Ten years' inflation has drastically reduced these limits and the
amounts seem insufficient to permit any serious corruption risk. 89
186. While most individual campaign workers could not be compensated by the group for
their service to the candidate, see 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(ii) (1982) (contribution includes pay-
ment by any person for services rendered to political committee), a PAC or its affiliated group
could supply a lawyer or an accountant and pay his regular salary for time spent ensuring
compliance with the federal campaign laws. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(ix)(II) (1982) (not a
contribution if paid by regular employer solely for compliance purposes).
187. Partisan communications advocate support for a party or candidate. See 1 T.
SCHWARZ & A. STRAUS, supra note 142, § 3.02[l][a]. They must be directed by the corpora-
tion or union only to a restricted class of people (for example, the members of the union and
their families). See id. Nonpartisan communications may go beyond the restricted class and
generally relate to voter registration or get-out-the-vote efforts or involve discussion of public
issues without mention of a candidate or election. See id. § 3.02[l][b]. Nonpartisan commu-
nication costs are not subject to regulation or disclosure under the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act but partisan communication costs must be disclosed to the FEC to the extent that
they exceed $2,000 for one candidate in one election. See id. § 3.02[1][a]-[b].
188. Between 1972 and 1980, campaign spending rose 183% while prices in general rose
97%. Samuelson, The Campaign Reform Failure, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 5, 1983, at 28, 29.
189. The $5,000 maximum PAC contribution is slightly more than 2% of the average
cost of a successful 1982 House campaign, $214,767. 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 723 (1983).
The average cost of a successful House campaign in 1976 was $87,240. Id.
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The votes of a few members of Congress may be bought for a $5,000
contribution, "but probably too few to endanger the Republic." 190
If contribution limits were doubled, there would be far less incen-
tive to make independent expenditures in House and Senate races or
to contribute to PACs which do so. Continuing the $5,000 limit for
multicandidate PACs may be unwise, since it steers individual con-
tributions, subject to a $1,000 limit, through PACs.191 PACs con-
nected to unions, corporations, or trade associations are more likely
than individuals to seek a quid pro quo because of their close rela-
tion to active lobbying organizations. 192
Increasing or eliminating the limit on contributions to PACs
would allow more independent spending. However, contributors
probably still will prefer to give money directly to candidates. It is
important to raise all contribution limits and to permit contribu-
tions to presidential candidates whether or not there is public fi-
nancing. Reasonable contribution limits allow people to give
money to candidates who control their campaigns. Reasonable lim-
its also encourage contributors to make legal and disclosed
contributions.
Under the doctrine of Buckley and its successors, the best way
to deal with independent spending by PACs is to eliminate the in-
centives for contributors to give money to them and to reduce the
incentives for PACs to make independent expenditures. 193 In-
dependent spending PACs will evade expenditure limits, whether
part of a public financing plan or "agreed to" by candidates. Limits
on aggregate PAC contributions to candidates will be ineffective for
the same reason. Sensible contribution limits and effective disclo-
sure requirements allow candidates to get their messages to voters
without being drowned out by independent spenders' advertising.
Political contributors prefer to give money to candidates rather
than to independent spending PACs. Reasonable limits, subject to
inflation adjustment, also will help vulnerable contributors resist
arm twisting by overzealous candidates and fundraisers.
190. Id.
191. J. ARMOR, supra note 14, at 5.
192. But cf. Nicholson, supra note 141, at 990-92 (it would still be possible for an individ-
ual "fat cat" to seek a quid pro quo).
193. See Note, Independent Political Committees, supra note 53, at 993 (concluding that
funds should be diverted from independent committees to presidential candidates by raising
spending limits and permitting contributions to candidates).
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V. CONCLUSION
PACs were born of the movement to regulate campaign finance.
Unwise restrictions have stimulated PAC growth and PAC use of
the independent expenditure technique. So far, however, only the
nonconnected PACs, particularly NCPAC, have made substantial
use of the independent expenditure tactic. Current reform propos-
als are likely to stimulate more independent spending. Connected
PACs and their corporate, union, and trade association sponsors
will use independent spending to avoid unreasonable restrictions.
Unless the Supreme Court dramatically shifts its position con-
cerning campaign finance, reformers should concentrate on increas-
ing the limits on individual contributions, raising funding and
expenditure limits in presidential campaigns, and improving the dis-
closure requirements. This strategy will keep political money in
proper channels. Candidates will have reasonable opportunities to
raise adequate funds, and contributors will give more to candidates
and less to independent spending PACs. There will be less need to
resort to undisclosed contributions, legal or illegal.
Reformers would be shortsighted to resort to public financing of
congressional races or to maintain or reduce contribution limits.
Proponents of such changes have failed to demonstrate why they
are necessary or to confront their potentially harmful consequences.
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